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COMPOSITION AND CHRISTOLOGY
Brian Leftow
One central claim of orthodox Christianity is that in Jesus of Nazareth, God 
became man. On Chalcedonian orthodoxy, this involves one person, God 
the Son, having two natures, divine and human. If He does, one person 
has two properties, deity and humanity. But the Incarnation also involves 
concrete objects, God the Son (GS), Jesus’s human body (B) and—I will as-
sume—Jesus’s human soul (S). If God becomes human, GS, B and S somehow 
become one thing. It would be good to have a metaphysical account of their 
oneness. I have suggested one. Thomas Senor has criticized my suggestion. 
I now reply to his case.
One central claim of orthodox Christianity is that in Jesus of Nazareth, 
God became man. On Chalcedonian orthodoxy, this involves one person, 
God the Son, having two natures, divine and human. If He does, one per-
son has two properties, deity and humanity. But the Incarnation also in-
volves concrete objects, God the Son (GS), Jesus’s human body (B) and—I 
will assume—Jesus’s human soul (S).1 If God becomes human, GS, B and S 
somehow become one thing. It would be good to have a metaphysical ac-
count of their oneness. I have suggested one.2 Thomas Senor has criticized 
my suggestion.3 I now reply to his case. I begin by explaining my view.
Composition and Hypostatic Union
GS is incarnate only if GS, B and S come to form one thing, and the rela-
tions between GS and the composite B + S are so intimate that GS comes to 
be human by bearing them. I argue elsewhere that GS is not identical with 
B or B + S, that neither came to constitute Him, and that neither became 
1Nothing turns on this; one could still hold a compositional Christology given only GS 
and B.
2See Brian Leftow, “A Timeless God Incarnate,” in The Incarnation, ed. Stephen Davis, 
Daniel Kendall, and Gerald O’Collins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 273–299. Other 
compositional accounts are possible, on which B, S or B + S become part of GS. The first and 
third imply that GS, an immaterial divine Person, becomes a partly material object. For reasons 
to reject that sort of compositional account, see my “Against Materialist Christology,” in Reason 
and Christian Belief, ed. Colin Ruloff and Gerald O’Collins (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, forthcoming). The last objection raised there applies also to the proposal to take just 
S as part of GS.
3Thomas Senor, “The Compositional Account of the Incarnation,” Faith and Philosophy 
24 (2007): 52–71.
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part of Him.4 If these arguments are correct, then in the Incarnation there 
came to be a composite including GS, B and S. For if GS neither were, were 
constituted by, included nor formed a composite including B and S, there 
would be no one concrete thing GS, B and S made up. But a man is one 
concrete thing, made up from other things. So there would be no man who 
was GS incarnate. GS would be a discarnate deity using a human endow-
ment, not one made human by it. My particular compositional model is 
that GS, B and S came to compose one thing, but neither B nor S became 
part of GS.
Traditional Christology calls whatever relation(s) render GS incarnate 
in B + S hypostatic union. Compositional models of the Incarnation raise 
the question of how composition and hypostatic union are related. The 
answer may differ depending on whether composition is restricted: that 
is, whether only some pluralities of items are such that some one further 
item has all and only them as parts. If composition is restricted, then on 
my account hypostatic union accounts for the fact that there is a compos-
ite GS + B + S; hypostatic union is a form of composition or a relation on 
which composition supervenes. Plausibly, if composition is restricted, it is 
not merely contingently restricted. If we assume this, then on my account, 
if composition is restricted,
(1) Necessarily (GS is incarnate as Jesus of Nazareth ≡ there is a com-
posite GS + B + S ≡ hypostatic union links GS, B and S).
If hypostatic union is a form of composition, rather than a relation that 
explains composition, we can assert not just (1), but that my compositional 
account states an abstract aspect of what it is for GS to be incarnate—that 
it tells us a bit of what hypostatic union is.
On the other hand, perhaps composition is unrestricted: that is, per-
haps all pluralities of items compose something. If composition is un-
restricted, GS, B and S would compose something even if GS were not 
incarnate: there would be a composite GS + B + S given only that GS, B 
and S exist. So if composition is unrestricted, on the plausible assumption 
that it is not contingently unrestricted, we may not have (1). We have that 
necessarily (GS is incarnate as Jesus ≡ hypostatic union links GS, B and 
S). But we may also have that possibly GS, B and S form a composite but 
GS is not incarnate.
If composition is unrestricted, perhaps hypostatic union is not a form 
of composition. Perhaps there is a composite GS + B + S just by mereo-
logical summation, and hypostatic union only determines what kind of 
composite it is. Even if this is how things are, it will be the case that the 
Incarnation occurs only if there is a composite GS + B + S, and I maintain 
that my model gives the proper picture of the composite.5 But whether 
a relation effects composition among a particular set of items does not 
4Leftow, “Against Materialist Christology.” 
5As vs. models that might see B, S or B + S becoming part of GS.
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depend on extrinsic facts about whether and how other things are com-
posed. It is a matter of the nature of the relation itself. Whether composi-
tion is restricted has no effect on the nature of hypostatic union. So it 
seems plausible that
((Composition is restricted) and (hypostatic union is a form of or a su-
pervenience base for composition)) > ((Composition is unrestricted) > 
(hypostatic union is a form of or a supervenience base for composition)).
If composition is in fact unrestricted, and (as I’ve supposed) whether it is 
restricted is a necessary matter, this is a counterpossible. It is thus true 
for at least trivial semantic reasons. But there is nothing unusual in also 
attaching substantive significance to certain counterpossibles in philo-
sophical argument. If composition is in fact restricted, then I don’t need 
this claim and so needn’t worry about its truth-value.
I see nothing particularly difficult in the claim that even if composition 
is unrestricted, hypostatic union is a form of or a supervenience-base for 
composition. In fact, if it is necessary that composition is unrestricted, 
then on one weak account of supervenience, every relation is one on which 
composition supervenes, since necessarily, for any items xy standing in 
some relation, it is also the case that just xy compose a whole. But even if 
composition is unrestricted, hypostatic union could not just weakly sub-
vene composition in this way, but ground or explain it, or just be a form of 
composition. On the traditional picture, the Incarnation began at Jesus’s 
conception. Prior to this, one can well hold, B and S did not exist. So one 
can well hold that at Jesus’s conception, GS, B and S came to be related 
both by mereological summation and by hypostatic union, and that each, 
on its own, would suffice to explain their forming a whole. Effects can be 
overdetermined; why not composition? Even if composition is unrestrict-
ed, there is still a distinction to be made between mere sums (like that of 
your nose and Alpha Centauri) and (say) biological organisms. Intuitively, 
organisms are “tighter” unities. It is not unreasonable to infer that a less 
universal composition-relation unites an organism’s parts—and so too 
then GS, B and S. If hypostatic union effects composition even if composi-
tion is unrestricted, then even if composition is unrestricted, my account 
does not just model the relation of GS, B and S. For then the Incarnation 
occurs because there comes to be a composition-effecting relation between 
GS, B and S, and again, it may be that my account reveals an abstract as-
pect of what it is for there to be an incarnate deity.
Platonic dualism and the Incarnation
Let’s approach the Incarnation by way of an analogy. For ease of exposi-
tion I assume that composition is restricted; it should be clear how to 
transform the story if it is not. Suppose then that Platonic dualism is true: 
I do not have a soul. Instead I am a soul. I am also a human being, because 
I am embodied in a human body. Perhaps even if unembodied I would be 
a human soul, but if I pre-existed my body that could at most mean I’m 
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the sort of soul naturally fit only to be human if embodied, and if I am a 
human soul after my body dies the most else this could mean would be 
that I am a soul who was once an embodied human, and somehow the 
property of being human “stuck.” If this is so, I am human only if there 
is or was a composite, BL plus a body, B*. B* and I are one thing somehow. 
If I am an immaterial soul, B* is not me, nor does B* constitute me, nor do 
I include B*, and so (as above) what’s left to make sense of our being one 
thing is that I and B* make up some sort of composite, however loosely 
united its parts. Some have denied this account of Platonic dualism. 
Aquinas, for one, took Platonic dualism to include the view that soul is to 
body as, e.g., sailor is to ship, and so denied that on it, soul and body are 
genuinely a composite and genuinely make up something as “unified” as 
a human being ought to be.6 But there is a lot of contentious metaphysics 
behind both denials. Many would allow that causal systems as loosely 
united as a sailor and a ship are single composite things, and it is to me 
unclear just how one might determine the right “degree of unity” for a 
human being to have. And in any case, a Platonic dualist might well deny 
Aquinas’s analogy.
Suppose now that, as many dualists have thought, souls are as such 
immortal. Then if I died, a Platonic dualist might well say that
(BL) BL died qua human but not qua soul.
One reading of (BL) runs this way: souls can’t die. When B* dies, BL the 
immortal soul continues to exist. He just undergoes a change of property. 
But humans do die, and unless a soul which was once a human being 
remains a human being, humans do cease to exist (the count of humans in 
the world reduces, even though the count of things that were once human 
does not). I am both a soul and a human. If I die, this can’t imply that a 
soul dies. It can only mean that a human dies. So if I die, this is something 
I am able to do only because I am not just a soul but also human.
Let’s now look more closely at the underlying metaphysics: at what 
makes (BL) true when I die. On Platonic dualism, I am now both a soul 
and a human, a subject of the property humanity. I have that property 
because I have a body of a particular sort. A soul/human dies because 
his/her body dies: I die because B* dies. I die only in the sense that B* dies 
and I go through that process with it. For me to die is for the body having 
which makes me human to die. For me to have B* as my body, and so be 
made human, is for certain relations to bind B* and I. On Platonic dualism, 
as I’ve said, these include composition—they consist in whatever makes 
B* and I compose something. So what makes (BL) true when I die is this: 
there is a human, BL, who is human because relations between BL and B* 
make them compose and include their composing BL + B*. B* dies. BL does 
not. Perhaps B* ceases to exist, leaving only remains, or perhaps B* still 
exists but is no longer BL’s body. Either way it is plausible that BL’s dying 
6So e.g., sCg II, 57. 
314 Faith and Philosophy
included BL + B*’s ceasing to exist. (BL) does not wear the involvement of 
composition on its sleeve. All the same, BL’s dying consists in B*’s dying 
and BL + B*’s ceasing to exist, and this is so because relations between BL 
and B* make them compose and include their composing BL + B*. (BL)’s 
underlying metaphysics is partly mereological, though (BL)’s form does 
not reveal this.
Christologists typically say things like
(2) Jesus Christ died qua human but not qua divine.7
I read (2) largely as I just read (BL). Jesus Christ = GS.8 Divine beings are 
as such eternal. They cannot cease to exist. Not being biological, they can’t 
die. So GS was able to die only because in addition to being divine He was 
human. A divine being can die only by having a body which dies and per-
haps having a soul and body separate. As to the underlying metaphysics, 
GS had acquired a human body and soul. The body died. So His biological 
life ceased, though He continued to exist. His human soul went its separate 
way—and all that constituted His dying. This is all His dying could amount 
to. There is a deity, GS, who is human because relations between GS and 
B + S make them compose and include their composing GS + B + S. B 
dies. GS does not. In the Incarnation, a deity dies because the human body 
composed with Him dies. Plausibly there then ceases to be a composite 
GS + B + S. But there remains part of it, GS + S. S is a human-type soul. So 
plausibly GS remains incarnate even while He lacks a human body, and 
plausibly since the soul which is then the sole vehicle of the incarnation is 
human-type, GS remains human or else is as close to human as any of us is 
(or as what is left of us is) when the like occurs to us. GS’s dying consists in 
B’s dying and GS + B + S’s ceasing to exist, and this is so because relations 
between GS and B + S make them compose and include their composing 
GS + B + S. (2)’s underlying metaphysics is partly mereological, though 
(2)’s form does not reveal this.
does Composition Help?
Christology has sought to use qua -statements to deal with puzzles the In-
carnation generates. Senor has more than one idea about what my mereo-
logical reading of “qua” is supposed to do. He thinks I mean it to give “a 
way of understanding the metaphysics of the incarnation that blocks the 
inference from ‘S qua N is P’ to ‘S is P.’”9 Consider the claim that
Jesus Christ is of limited power qua human but not qua divine.
The relevant inferences would be
7Senor consistently uses such locutions as “qua His human nature” and “qua His divine 
nature” (e.g., “The Compositional Account,” 56). This isn’t how the tradition speaks.
8Using “Jesus Christ” as a name for GS is a terminological shift; in “A Timeless God 
Incarnate,” I called the composite GS + B + S Jesus Christ. I explain the shift below.
9Senor, “The Compositional Account,” 53.
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Jesus Christ is of limited power qua human. So
Jesus Christ is of limited power.
Jesus Christ is not of limited power qua divine. So
Jesus Christ is not of limited power.
It would make these inferences problematic if they yield that Jesus Christ 
is and is not of limited power—and this is (as it seems) a contradiction. 
Now actually, a mereological Christology could just grant these infer-
ences and de-fang the appearance of contradiction. We have a composite, 
GS + B + S, and due to the Incarnation, both the powers proper to GS and 
the powers proper to B + S belong to GS. GS is not of limited power in and 
of Himself. By composition with B + S He acquires the use of a limited set 
of powers, at least some of them redundant. (At least some things B + S 
is naturally empowered to do GS can already do, e.g., think. But perhaps 
there are things B + S is naturally empowered to do that GS cannot al-
ready do, e.g., walk.) B + S’s powers are GS’s extrinsic powers, powers He 
has due to relations to something outside Himself, so GS has at His dis-
posal a limited extrinsic as well as an unlimited intrinsic set of powers. 
The powers reside in distinct parts of the composite, and so there is no 
contradiction in its containing both; GS has the powers in two different 
ways (intrinsically and extrinsically) owing to the makeup of G + B + S, 
and so there is no contradiction in His possessing both.
However, a mereological Christology can also block the inference. This 
inference fails because properties of parts need not become properties of 
other parts of the same whole: part of the wall weighs a ton, but another 
part may weigh less, and though GS forms a composite with something 
possessing only limited power (B + S), it does not follow that GS thereby 
ceases to be omnipotent. Rather, B + S has intrinsically only limited pow-
ers, and if GS limits Himself to using just B + S’s natural powers, GS will 
act solely out of a limited set of powers, though remaining intrinsically 
omnipotent.
Senor seems to concede that “qua” read mereologically manages to 
block the inference; he nowhere claims that the inference goes through 
despite it. But he also writes that
Whether [the composite GS + B + S] borrows (a) divine . . . or (a) human 
property will not be resolved by the use of reduplicative sentences. Yet this 
is precisely where . . . the qua-move was supposed to be useful.10
I have not supposed that it is useful for this. It could not be. If the compos-
ite is F qua human, i.e., in virtue of including as a part a natural human en-
dowment, it will typically be true that a divine being as such is not F: thus 
if the composite is mortal qua human, it is also true that a divine being as 
such is immortal. Since the composite has a divine being as a part, it will 
10Ibid., 66.
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be just as true that it is not F qua divine as that it is F qua human. Since both 
qua-statements are true, they have equal claim, just as qua-statements, to 
transfer their predicate to the whole composite. (This is a minimal thesis, 
which does not imply that either does have such a claim.) The mereologi-
cal reading doesn’t discriminate between them and so can’t adjudicate 
between them. If the composite is omnipotent qua divine (i.e., contains 
a divine part which is omnipotent) and non-omnipotent qua human (i.e., 
contains a natural human endowment which is not), omnipotence and 
non-omnipotence can’t both transfer to the whole. All the mereological 
reading tells us is that if either property transfers, it does so inter alia be-
cause part of the whole has the property primarily. I nowhere claim that it 
explains why properties transfer (thereby giving us a way to judge which 
ones will do so).
Senor also writes that if “these property pairs will have to be worked 
out one at a time . . . the qua move does not, in fact, give us any general 
help in resolving the logical difficulties of the incarnation.”11 This seems 
wrong to me. The mereological reading leaves it that the pairs must be 
worked out one at a time because it blocks the move from “S qua N is P” to 
“S is P.” Blocking this is enough on its own to meet the only logical diffi-
culty Senor raises for the doctrine of the Incarnation, that it seems that for 
many properties F, humans are as such F and a deity is as such ¬F, so that 
if something is both divine and human, it will follow that it is F and ¬F.12
Half and Half
I allow that the composite might have as parts a deity which is F and a 
body-soul composite which is not, but borrow neither property. I offer this 
analogy:
Consider a sphere whose surface is half-white, half-black: it has a white part 
and a black part, and neither ‘white’ nor ‘black’ applies to it as a whole, for 
the way we use color-words requires [something like] that a thing be called 
[say] black only if the majority of its surface is black.
Senor claims that this offends against (what he dubs) the law of exclud-
ed middle for properties: “for every object O and . . . property P, either 
O exemplifies P or O does not exemplify P.”13 I say: no foul. Black and 
white are contraries, not contradictories. Every uniform color or color-
pattern is a contrary to both. The sphere does not exemplify black and 
does not exemplify white, but exemplifies a third property, half-white-
and-half-black. Senor is wrong that for me in this case “being black . . . 
does apply to some degree.”14 I think it applies fully to the part and not 
at all to the whole.
11Ibid., 66.
12Ibid., 52.
13Ibid., 68.
14Ibid.
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an Impersonal Christ?
On my approach, B and S do not become parts of GS. They do become 
parts of GS + B + S. Senor notes that if this is so, GS ≠ GS + B + S. He then 
infers that
Either there are two persons in the incarnation [GS and GS + B + S] or 
[GS + B + S] is not a person . . . if [GS + B + S] is not a person, there is no 
person who is God Incarnate. The doctrine of the Incarnation is supposed 
to (imply) that God knows our condition because God the Son was one of 
us. The compositional account . . . denies this . . . it substitutes for a personal 
God Incarnate . . . an impersonal conglomerate.15
This seems to me to go astray. GS ≠ GS + B + S: there are times at which 
both exist and the latter includes parts GS doesn’t. But consider an anal-
ogy from Aquinas16 which is fully compatible with the mereological ap-
proach: GS is to B + S as soul is to body in ordinary dualism. To make 
the analogy closer, suppose (as Aquinas does not) that I am a soul.17 Then 
once I have a body, B*, there are two things, BL and a composite, BL + B*, 
which is Embodied BL. Embodied BL includes parts BL doesn’t. So Em-
bodied BL ≠ BL. Is Embodied BL an “impersonal conglomerate”? I act in 
the world through B*. When I do, in one sense, I alone act. But in another, 
I and B* act together—B* is my instrument, and the instrument makes a 
distinctive causal contribution to the result. I saw wood, but in another 
sense I and the saw must act together, since I lack the sharpness and stiff-
ness the job requires. This would still be true were there something I and 
the saw compose (imagine the saw grafted onto me, say). So if I and the 
saw compose something, I act, but that composite also acts as a whole, by 
my initiating intention and the saw’s implementing powers. So too a for-
tiori the composite BL + B*. It can indeed act as a whole. If I run into you, I 
strike you with its weight, having none of my own strictly speaking, and 
I strike you with my agency and moral responsibility, since I direct the 
composite’s path. Because of this, you can have personal relations with 
an embodied person—the whole thing, not just the person embodied. Not 
every part of the composite is what you intend to have personal relations 
with (you want to have them with me, not my body) but in the same way, 
if I am just a live body, not every part of that composite is what you intend 
to have personal relations with (you want to have them with me, not my 
big toe), and yet it is true that you have them with the whole composite. 
B* is my instrument for dealing with you, as the saw is my instrument 
for cutting; in the same sense in which you might be cut by BL + saw, 
if there were such a thing, you might be addressed by or find compas-
sion in BL + B*. In dealing with BL + B* you deal with a person, precisely 
in virtue of his distinctively personal attributes. So it seems a stretch to 
15Ibid., 55–6.
16sCg IV, 41.
17A referee suggested the soul-body analogy. I develop it my own way.
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call BL + B* impersonal. For BL + B* is just a human being, understood as 
Platonism understands him, together with the natural endowment (B*) 
which makes him count as human.
Being personal is not quite the same thing as being a person—as is often 
said in discussing God or the Trinitarian Persons. No person is identi-
cal with BL + B*: I am not, since we are assuming Platonic dualism and 
so BL + B* contains a part I do not, and certainly BL + B* is no-one else. 
But as President Clinton reminded us, “is” can express many things. In 
one looser sense of “is,” BL + B* is me, and there is a person who “is” 
BL + B*: I’m its dominant part, speaking for it, initiating its actions, being 
the person you deal with in dealing with it. BL + B* “is” me because the 
rest of BL + B* doesn’t matter to the question of with whom you have to 
do. The only way you can speak to me is for me to don a body. The body 
lets you confront me. When you confront BL + B*, you confront me: in 
the same looser sense, BL + B* is me. Why not the same, then, for GS and 
GS + B + S?18
I now turn to the question of whether GS if only composed with B + S 
“knows our condition.” On my account, GS had a body but was not identi-
cal with it, as with us. GS’s life animated it. His intentions made it move. 
He felt sensations originating in it. He suffered due to damage in it. He 
died because it did. He had a soul but was not identical with it, as with us. 
His thoughts coursed through a human mind implemented in that body 
and that soul. In short, GS owned a full human natural endowment, and 
it affected Him as ours do us. In this sense, GS “knew our condition” on 
my model.
There is also a fuller sense one might give to “knowing our condition.” 
In this sense no account of how GS, B and S relate answers the question of 
whether He “knew our condition,” and the only relevant point to make is 
whether an account of this is compatible with His knowing our condition. 
For instance, one way to hold that incarnate GS is radically one of us is to 
hold that materialism is true of us and somehow, in the incarnation, it 
comes to be the case that GS = B. Even if GS was physical like us, though, 
it does not follow that He completely “knew our condition.” One could 
hold both that GS = B and that GS on earth was not “one of us” in this full-
er sense because He had a life-experience radically unlike ours: perhaps 
including uninterrupted communion with the other Persons, full ability 
to draw on their knowledge (even if He can’t physically store its full extent 
in His brain) and full ability to tap their omnipotence (and so a kind of 
18All this has responded to Senor in the terms his criticism presupposes—that either 
GS + B + S is the personal thing in the Incarnation or there is no personal thing there. 
There is also a simpler answer to Senor’s worry that “there is no person who is God Incar-
nate,” which is actually my “official” answer: even on my model, there is, and it is GS. But 
this in the dialectical context isn’t quite fair. Senor poses the problem as he does because 
he was misled by my earlier piece’s bad choice of terminology: I used “Jesus Christ” as a 
name for GS + B + S, and that made it sound as if I meant GS + B + S to be the person in the 
Incarnation. Given my misuse of “Jesus Christ,” Senor’s argument is perfectly reasonable, 
and so I have in fairness replied to it on its own terms.
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derivative omnipotence founded not in the powers of His body but in His 
unique relations to the other Persons). Hold my view, on the other hand, 
and one could easily also hold that GS “knew our condition” in the pres-
ent fuller sense. One can hold that GS lived under B and S’s limitations, 
e.g., had access prior to the Resurrection only to knowledge He could have 
through the purely natural use of these, in causal dependence only on 
both and the physical environment, and prior to the Resurrection had the 
use only of powers naturally inherent in any composite of B + S’s kind. It 
is open to me to say that He used B + S only as we use our natural endow-
ments and drew on no distinctively divine resources while on earth. If all 
this is compatible with it, I don’t see how my account could imply that GS 
didn’t know our condition in this fuller sense and so “wasn’t one of us” 
in the fullest way.
Senor might query the sense in which GS owned a human natural en-
dowment: He was not identical with it, and its parts were not His. He 
might claim that B and S are more like artificial grippers tacked onto an 
ordinary human body than like limbs grafted into it,19 and so claim that 
the ownership relation here is insufficiently intimate to qualify GS as 
“one of us” via incarnation. But on any version of dualism, the soul is not 
identical with the body, nor are body-parts parts of the soul, and yet the 
soul-body connection is more intimate than that between a body and an 
artificial gripper. On Cartesian forms of dualism, this ownership consists 
in there being certain exclusive causal relations between soul and body: 
the soul’s basic actions are implemented only in this body, through which 
the soul thus has all its impact on the world, and similarly the world can 
have no impact on the soul unless it is mediated through this body.20 Thus 
it would suffice for Cartesian ownership were some basic actions of GS 
implemented only in B + S and none implemented in any other material 
thing and were there some ways the world could have impact on GS only 
through B + S and no ways it could affect GS through any other mate-
rial thing. On standard Western theism, the last condition is trivially met, 
since the world affects God at most by causing some of His cognitive 
states to be as they are, and each part of the world does this directly and 
immediately, not through any other part of the world. Strongly kenotic 
Christologies might say more—that for the duration of the Incarnation, or 
perhaps its earthly phase, all of GS’s basic actions were implemented only 
in B + S and the world affected GS only through B + S.
Pre-Cartesian dualisms add to the foregoing that a particular body is the 
body of a particular soul because that soul animates that body. In the Incar-
nation, GS brings about some relation between events in S + B and His own 
existence such that these events count as part of that existence. Perhaps 
19Senor, “The Compositional Account,” 57–59.
20For one such account of embodiment, see Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism, 
2d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 104–105; The Evolution of the soul (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 146–152; and The Christian god (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), 56–60. 
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this is enough to sustain the animation claim. If not, we can add that while 
the life in B consists in ordinary biological processes, these processes are 
not just divinely sustained in the ordinary way: rather, they have a special 
relation to GS’s causal activity. Perhaps GS renders their connection to His 
causation involuntary (as the “animating” soul-to-body connection was 
thought to be). Perhaps whatever a pre-Cartesian soul does for its body in 
animating it, He does directly. On the other hand, He might well animate B 
through S, so that S is the proximate and He the more remote cause of this. 
What we make of this would depend, of course, on just how GS relates to S. 
However we parse the GS-B relation, if a soul animates a body, incorpora-
tion of a part into that body’s ongoing life makes the soul “own” it in the 
most intimate way a soul can. So too, if GS animates B, incorporation of a 
material part into B’s ongoing life makes GS “own” it in the most intimate 
way. As to GS’s relation to S, if I can hold that GS brings it about that GS 
alone is the person whose soul S is—i.e., if I can avoid Nestorianism—I can 
hold that any of S’s operations are automatically ascribed to GS, just as any 
of my soul’s operations are automatically ascribed to me.
If we keep the identity relation classical, there seem to be the following 
main ways to relate GS, B and S in the Incarnation:
(3) GS = B,
(4) GS = S,
(5) GS = B + S,
(6) GS ≠ B, but B constitutes GS,
(7) GS ≠ S, but S constitutes GS,
(8) GS ≠ B + S, but B + S constitutes GS,
(9) B + S became part of GS, or
(10) GS, B and S came to compose one thing, but B + S did not become 
part of GS.
Let’s distinguish (a) and (b) versions of (6)–(8): the (a) versions involve a 
theory of constitution on which it is a relation between wholly distinct 
entities, and the (b) versions a theory of constitution on which constituting 
and constituted entities are temporarily, contingently or relatively identi-
cal.21 I argue against (3), (5), (9), and the (b) versions elsewhere.22 On (10) 
and the (a) versions, there will be causal and other relations between B, S 
and GS in virtue of which they make up a whole. They are the same rela-
tions on any of these. The alternatives differ only in their metaphysical 
reading of the consequences of these relations’ obtaining. If the truth is 
one of these, these relations suffice to make GS one of us on the true ac-
21For details see material Constitution, ed. Michael Rea (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Little-
field, 1997). 
22Leftow, “Against Materialist Christology."
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count. But if they do, they would on the rest, since they are the same rela-
tions. So they would on (10), one version of which is my view. As to (4), here 
the causal and other relations are just those between GS and B; GS takes 
over S’s role. The relations are as like those in (10) or the (a) versions as this 
simplification permits. So it is likely that if (4) is the true account, and (4)’s 
relations are enough to make GS one of us, the relations in (10) are also 
enough. After all, (10) and (4) differ only by the inclusion of a further part.
Persons and Parts
There is however one point I must concede to Senor.23 I had argued that 
my view avoids Nestorianism (the heresy one would have if B + S, by 
themselves, constituted a person distinct from GS) by appeal to the claims 
that persons don’t have persons as parts and B + S is part of GS + B + S. 
This treated GS + B + S as a person. Though I have argued that GS + B + S 
is personal, there is no person with which it is identical. So I cannot use 
this move. I slipped up because in the paper to which Senor responds, I 
needed a term to refer to what I have been calling GS + B + S, and had 
the bright idea of using “Jesus Christ,” a personal name. This let me fool 
myself. I’ve switched to “GS + B + S” here because it does not appear to be 
a personal name. If we reserve “Jesus Christ” for GS, we wind up saying 
that Jesus Christ is the sole person in GS + B + S. But of course: there is 
GS and there is B + S, the two together compose GS + B + S, and only one 
of them is a person.
Having conceded to Senor here, I need another way to avoid Nestorian-
ism. I provide more than one elsewhere.24 I also need a second mereologi-
cal reading of the Christological “qua”: the one I gave in the original paper 
applies only to GS + B + S. If composition with B + S is enough to qualify 
GS as human, we can assert (2) and analyze it as I do above. As noted, the 
position thus clarified can still block contradiction: properties of other 
parts of wholes including A need not transfer to A. But some such proper-
ties do transfer: because my right hand is in the water, my right hand is a 
proper part of something with a proper part in the water, and therefore 
my left hand is also a proper part of something with a proper part in the 
water. There is still the same need to work out case by case what does 
transfer and why.
I took up the mereological account to explain how a timeless GS could 
remain so and yet be incarnate in a temporal B + S. My earlier account of 
this turns out to need no alteration save substituting “GS + B + S” at ap-
propriate places; so too its treatment of GS’s being and B + S’s not being 
omnipotent. I have already given my account of (2). I have also discussed 
elsewhere the claim that
GS + B + S is uncreated qua God but qua man is created.
23Senor, “The Compositional Account,” 56.
24Brian Leftow, “The Humanity of God,” in The metaphysics of the Incarnation, ed. Anna 
Marmodoro and Jonathan Hill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 20–24.
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I now add that
Jesus Christ is uncreated qua God but qua man is created
should be read this way: Jesus Christ is GS, who is divine by His own 
individual essence. So what He is qua God, He is simpliciter. Thus GS is 
uncreated, period. Even if He is a man, it cannot be true that the man He 
is is created, for the man He is is GS. GS is human by composition with 
B + S, i.e., by having a human natural endowment. B + S is created, pe-
riod. (11) can assert only that GS is part of a whole with a created part, and 
thereby has a property, being human, His possession of which depends 
on a created thing. He is created qua man only in the sense that something 
created makes Him a man, and so a divine act of creation makes Him a 
man. Finally, I also discussed
(11) GS + B + S qua God is impeccable but qua man was tempted.
That treatment stands, but I add that we should read
Jesus Christ qua God is impeccable but qua man was tempted
as that GS is simply impeccable, but the attribute of being tempted trans-
fers. This just summarizes things I said originally. So when I use “Jesus 
Christ” as I should, as a personal name, what I said previously does not 
alter, but I must add a bit to it.25
University of oxford
25My thanks to the editor, referees and Joseph Jedwab for comments.
